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jPt%~neofthe most pervasive real effects
~ jlong-claimed for monetary policy is its
tilt abihty to affect interest rates in the short
run through channels other than the standard-
expected inflation effect. The alleged short-
term inverse relationship between interest
rates and monetary policy is often called the
“liquidity effect” of monetary policy We use
the term liquidity effect to refer to thepur-
ported statistical relation between expansion
of bank reserves or monetaryaggregates (or
perhaps only surprise expansions of these
aggregates) and short-run reductions in
short-term interest rates. The liquidity effect
can also refer to the common interpretation
of this purported statistical relation: that the
same central bank action that changes bank
reserves or monetaryaggregates also changes
short-term interest rates. This definition
corresponds to early use ofthe term, for
example, by Friedman in 1968.1
We distinguish between a nominal
liquidity effect (the aforementioned relation
with a nominal interest rate) and a real
liquidity effect (the aforementioned relation
with a real interest rate). Either may occur
without the other. For many purposes, real
liquidity effectsare more interestingbecause
they indicate real effects of monetary policy
On the other hand, central banks around the
world claim that their operatingprocedures
directly target or control nominal interest
rates—that they reduce reserves ofthe banking
system (perhaps through open market sales)
to raise the nominal interest rate or raise
reserves of the banking system (perhaps
through open market purchases) to reduce
the nominal interest rate. It is difficult to
interpret these claims without a coherent
model ofnominal liquidity effects.
The monetary policies that the Federal
Reserve claims that it follows require the
existence of liquidity effects. Many central
bank operatingprocedures that involve use
of the federal funds rate (or any other interest
rate) as a target, instrument, or operating
variable ofmonetary policy requirea liquidity
effect. The current operating procedure of
the Federal Reserve is predicated on theexis-
tence ofa liquidity effect in the sense that
the Fed uses the federal funds rate as its
proximate instrument of policy and contracts
quantities ofreservesand monetary aggregates
by raising the funds rate (and vice versa).
When the Fedraises the federal funds rate,
it reduces reserves by the amount sufficient
to achieve the desired increase. The smaller
the required reduction in reserves, the larger
the implied nominal liquidity effect. Of
course, acentral bank operating procedure
that attempts only to tie down the nominal
interest rate (which ties down the real inter-
est rate plus the expected rate of change of
the price level) may lack anominal anchor
to tie down the level of prices. If, however,
the operating procedure also includes apro-
vision to revert to control over the level of
monetary aggregates ifinflation exceeds some
critical level, then the price level may be
anchored at least within acertain range.
Attempts to isolate liquidity effects
empirically are often subject to aunique
problem: Ifthe central bank operating proce-
dure involves direct targeting of ashort-term
interest rate, statistical work and economic
models that treat amonetary aggregate as
exogenous and the nominal interest rate as
endogenous may be misleading. This has
led many economists to question the exis-
tence of liquidity effects. Although we do
not attempt to resolve that issue in this article,
we note thatother kinds of evidence (that do
not involve regressions of interest rates on
allegedly exogenous monetary aggregates)
suggest important liquidity effects in the
Some economists use the termIi-
breed1, viz, to refer to o particular
class oftheoretical medel attempting
to explain the purported reloflon.
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‘Of coarse, there coo he non,
supemeutrolities of money in flee
bte~riceequililnium models, such
as in cashlr’odvrace models, in
which the inflation tax reduces
luputs of lobor or crpital.
data. Cook and Hahn (1989), forexample,
interpret their results asshowing that changes
in Fed targets for the federal funds rate have
large, immediate effects on three-month, six-
month and 12-month Treasury bill rates,
without any apparent reverse effects of
Treasury bill rates on the funds rate.
This article assumes the existence of real
and nominal liquidity effects in the data and
discusses the main explanations for liquidity
effects that have been advanced in the litera-
ture. The theoreticalissues associated with
liquidity effects are important because different
models imply different welfare effects of
monetary policies and different effects on
interest rates and other variables. Also, dif-
ferent models of liquidity effectshave different
implications for optimal monetary policies.
They also provide different interpretations
of the data. Finally differing implications





The liquidity effect is a characteristic of
traditional sticky-price (Keynesian) models.
Consider a model with aconventional
money-demand function, and aprice level
that is perfectly sticky
(1) logI~~= a0
+ a0log(y)
—a, Iog(l+ 0 +
where m~ is nominal money demand, ~5is the
pre-determined price level,y is real income, i
is the nominal interest rate, and a,, is a mean-
zero disturbance to money demand so that
11(ç) = 0. Given thedouble-log specification,
the parameters a1 and a, are income and
interest elasticities, respectively
Suppose that the money supply, m,
increasespermanently by 10 percent. Because
the price level is perfectlysticky and money
demand equals money supply in equilibrium,
the real money supply also risesby 10 percent.
Assume that 0 < a1 1 (a relatively fiat LM
curve), which is consistent with empirical
estimates ofincome elasticities, and assume
that real income rises by less than 10 percent in
response to theexogenous 10 percent increase
in nominal money In this case, the nominal
interest rate would fall to equilibrate money
supply andmoney demand, thus generating
the liquidity effect. In most neoclassical
flexible-price models, however, the price level
would rise sufficiently in response to aper-
manent increase in the money supply so that
the real money supply real income and nom-
inal interest rates would be unchanged.’
f c ~ 2; -‘cr’tr-
Expectohde.s Mode!
Though it is not difficult to generate a
liquidity effect in an lS-LM model with sticky
prices, further research has shown that this
is not a generic feature ofsticky-price models.
To see why we consider a simple neoclassi-
cal-growth model with money and exogenous
price stickiness, as in recent work by Cho
and Cooley (1990) and King (1991). A rep-
resentative household maximizes discounted
expected utility with preferences defined
over consumption of a single physical good,
and leisure, I,.
(2) Max E0~fl’tu(c1,l,).
The household faces a period budget
constraint:




The household’s wealth (measured in
units ofthe consumption good) consists of
wage income, w, n~, capital income and
undepreciated capital stock, U’, + (1—8))k,,
and the real value of money including lump-
sum monetary transfers from thegovern-
ment, (rn + ‘r)/p. (In this economy the
price level is simply the dollar price of the
single good). The household uses its wealth
to purchase consumption, and acquire new
capital and new money We assume that
consumption purchases are subject to a cash-
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in-advance constraint; consumption can only
be acquired with existing cash:
(4) +T, pc,
A competitive firm produces the single
good using astochastic constant-returns-to-
scale production technology z, f(K,, N,), that
takeslabor (N) and capital (K) as inputs. The
term z is an exogenous productivity distur-
bance with the following autoregressive law
of motion:
(5) z, = (1 —Ø)+Øz,,,1
+ç.
The firm maximizes profits, treating factor
prices parametrically:
(6) Max Z,f(K,,N,)—w,N, —r,K.
Because the technology is constant returus to
scale, maximum profits arezero. Profit maxi-
mizing input choices by the firms yield the
following functions for factor prices (where





The resource constraint in this economy is:
(9) Z,f(K,,N,)+(16)K, C,+ K,~1.
Remaining equilibrium conditions are
givenby household first-order conditions
and market-clearing conditions. Efficient
household choices for consumption, labor
input, capital accumulation and money with
subscripts indicating partial derivatives, and
A denoting the date-t marginal value of
wealth, are:





We assume that money growth is exogenous,
and is given by the autoregressive process:
(13) lnM,= lnM,1
— ln(M,, ))+
Now, consider the one-period interest
rate on a (nominally) risk-freebond between
today and tomorrow. Although this assetwill
not be traded in this representative-agent
economy it is straightforward to compute
the equilibrium asset price. The equilibrium
interest rate implies that the representative
household has, at the margin, no incentive to
trade this security The interest rate on this
one-period bond is givenby the relation:
1 Ud (14) (l+i,+,)= —.
P0 L ~,+1 j
Equilibrium with
Pre-Determirted Prices
Suppose prices are set one period in
advance at the expected market-clearingprice.
(The commodity for which the pre-determined
price is an equilibrium is expected consump-
tion conditional on information at date t— 1.)
Given that the price is pre-determined, it is
necessary to specify a rule For allocations:
We first assume that output in this economy
is purely dernand-deterrnined. That is, the
representative firmsells as much output to
households as demanded at thepre-determined
price. This assumption is consistent with
recent sticky-price literature, as in Blanchard
and Kiyotaki (1987), in which monopolistically
competitive firms willinglysupply extra
demand, as long as price exceedsmarginal cost.
Unlike the lS-LM type model discussed
at the beginning of this section, it is ambigu-
ous whether the nominal interest rate falls in
response to an unexpected increase in the
money stock in this sticky-price economy
Assuming that the cash-in-advance con-
straint binds, consumption is relatively high
today which implies that the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption today and
tomorrow (the expected real interest rate) is
low, which tends to reduce the nominal
interest rate. Ifmoney growth is positively
serially correlated, then expected inflation is
high, which tends to increase the nominal
interest rate. It is easy to see this result ifwe
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assume that households have perfect foresight,
and that momentary utility is additively
separable:
(15)
Taking natural logs of the asset-pricing rela-
tion under perfect foresight, we obtain the
Fisher decomposition of the nominalinterest
rate into a real component and a nominal
component reflecting future inflation:
(16) i,~, — ln($) +p(ln(c,+, ) — in(c3)
+ln(p+1 ) — ln(p3.
Thus, the nominal interest rate falls only
ifthe utility curvature parameter, p, is suffi-
ciently large that the decline in the real interest
rate reflecting negative-consumption growth
more than offsetstheincrease in inflation. This
typically implies that the curvature parameter
pmust exceed 1. (That is, risk aversion of
the representative household exceeds that of
log utility).
Note that the effect ofan unexpected
increase in the money stock on the nominal
interest rate in this cash-in-advance economy
depends on the allocation (rationing) rule.
Suppose instead that output is determined by
the minimurn of quantitydemanded and quantity
supplied, as in Barro and Grossman (1971),
rather than being determined by the quantity-
demanded allocation rule. That is, house-
holds will be rationed in response to a positive
money shock, and firmswill be rationedin
response to a negative money shock. In this
“short-side” case, the cash-in-advance con-
straint no longer binds if there is a positive
money shock, and the nominal interest rate
must fall to zero. (This extreme response of
thenominal interest rate is an artifact ofthe
cash-in-advance framework of this model. It
would likely disappear in a similar model in
which theinterest elasticity of the demand for
money were non-zero.)
So!w’ng arid ~‘oanta two the
One•-Silctcr Sticky-Price NaoMi
Togain some insight into this issue with
a more general form ofpreferences, we have
conducted asimulation of the demand-
determined version of this model. Because
the model does not possess a closed fonn, we
computed an approximate equilibrium using
a version of Marcet’s (1990) procedure. We
choose functional forms and parameters that
have been commonly used in the business
cycle literature. We assume that the momen-
tary utility function is isoelastic, which is
consistent with steady-state growth:
(c0fl1~hi°”
(17) u(c,l)= / —1.
‘—p
Production possibilities are assumed to
be Cobb-Douglas:
(18) Zf(K,N)ZKONIB.
The discount factor, /3, equals 0.99, which
implies a steady-state real interest rate ofabout
4percent. Thepreference parameter. ~t, deter-
mines the share of discretionary time spent
in producing market goods. We set ~t= 0.37,
which implies that households work about
one-third of their discretionary time. The
curvature parameter p is set to 2. The pro-
duction parameter, 0, is equal to capital’s
share of income and has averaged about 0.36
in the United States. The depreciation rate,
6, is set to 0.025, which imphes an annual
depreciation rate of 10 percent. The persis-
tence parameter For the technology shock,
~, is 0.95, which is comparable to numbers
usedby Hansen (1985) and Prescott (1986).
The innovation variance is set to 0.007, which
is the estimate used by Prescott (1986) and
others. The serial correlation parameter for
money growth, p,, is 0.5, and the innovation
variance is set to 0.009.
The experiment consists of holding the
technology shock fixed at the unconditional
mean, and letting the money supply increase
by 1 percent at date t. The increase in the
money stock is completely unanticipated.
Unexpectedly high money growth raises real
output in this model. Assuming that the
cash-in-advance constraint binds, the per-
centage increase in consumption equals the
percentage increase in the money stock.
Figures 1-3 present the impulse response
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functions of capital, consumption and labor
input to a 1 percent, unanticipated, permanent
increase in the moneystock. The capital stock
increases only slightly; its increase is not
sufficient to generate persistent changes in
consumption or labor input. The response
of the nominal interest rate to the money
shock appears in Figure 4. The immediate
effect of the money shock is to increase the
nominal interest rate shghtly: A Fisher decom-
position shows that the real interest rate
declines, but that the increase in expected
inflation more than offsets this fall.
While we do not pursue a comprehen-
sive analysis of this one-sector model, this
example indicates that it is not necessarily
easy to generate nominal liquidity effects
in sticky-price models with explicit intertem-
poral optimization. Robert King reaches the
same conclusion in a related monetary model
whichdoes not have unitary income elasticity
of money demand, and which includes
multi-period price setting.
iiciuidi.ty Slidcts Maclets wIth
home %hr:l5~~ ‘05
Themodel discussed in the preceding
section had the property that the price level
was sticky in response to a monetary shock.
This section analyzes the liquidity effect in
an economyin which some, but not all, prices
aresticky The analysis in this section is
drawn from Ohanian and Stockman (1994).
The motivation behind this model is that
while there is considerable evidence suggesting
that some nominal prices change infrequently
(see Carlton, 1989), there is also abundant
evidence that many goods have prices that
change frequently such as food, automo-
biles, computers and gasoline. We consider
a model with two physical consumption
goods, X and Y, money introduced through
a cash-in-advance constraint, and complete
asset markets, with the exception ofthe
friction induced by the cash-in-advance
constraint. We first analyze avery simple
economy without capital. The equilibrium
in this simple economycan be calculated
very quickly and as a result it is possible to
evaluate the properties of this economy for
a widevariety ofparameter values.
Impulse Response of Capital Stock to
Money Shock
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Impulse Response of Consumption to
Money Shock
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~ from the government, P~ and P~ arenominal
prices, M isthe nominal money thehousehold
chooses as it leavesperiod-i asset markets and
enters period-i product markets, v is a vector
of other assets the household owns at the
beginning of period t, with dividend vector d
and ex-dividend price-vector q. We assume
1.01175 that households have constant elasticity of
101125 substitution preferences across the two phys- ical goods, where a-is the elasticity of substi-
1.01075 tution between x andy and p is a measure of
overall curvature of the utility function. And
1.01025 u is a leisure-preference parameter. (lip is
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.)
1.00975 Assume that the cash-in-advance con-
0 2 46810 12 14 16 18 20 straint (equation 21) binds as an equality
everyperiod and that r 0. It is easy to see
that the flexible-price perfect foresight equi-
A representative household maximizes librium for this simple production economy
discounted expected utility: satisfies
and
(21) M, — P~X,— P~ 0,
where equation 20 is a budget constraint for
period-I asset markets and inequality (equa-
tion 21) is the cash-in-advance constraint
whichapplies to period-i product markets
(which immediately follow period-t asset
markets, as in Lucas, 1982). The terms x
andy refer to consumption of goods X and
Y, Lk and L1 refer to the labor hours to pro-
duce goods X and 1’, 0~ 0 <1 is aparameter
ofthe production function, n, refers to the
household’s money holdings at the end of
period (t—1)product markets, rrefers to a
lump-sum transfer of money to the household
FEDERAL RESERVE RANK OF ST. LOUIS
Impulse Response of Interest Rate to
Money Shock
Percent deviations from steady state
1.01 225
(19) max E0E00[ I ((a-r)/a (22) = +
(i — (23) ~ = ~{a-r )/a
~(afla-r)(I I—pj
(o~’Ir/a
—a)y. ‘ J +(i —
—V.(i~+L~.,) - ( 2—1)/a
(24) ~ =
subject to the sequence ofconstraints +(i _a)y{a_1l/a)
(20) a,, +r, ~~ (1_a)L~a,
+v,(q, +d,) — v,,,1q = 0 (25)
u= /3~ .9. i,d .
(26)
where M~ is the (exogenous and constant,
because r= 0) money supply at the end of
period-i asset markets and A is the current-
value Lagrange multiplier on the constraint
ofequation 20, (Note that A = y, where y is
the current-value multiplier on the cash-in-
advance constraint, because of the first-order
condition for the choice ofM,.) Moreover,
we can solve for the nominal interest rate on







We now suppose that nominal prices
in the X industry are pre-determined: Sellers
choose the nominal priceP~, at the end of
period i—i. The nominal price of Y, on the
other hand, adjusts to clear markets each
period. We can vary the amount of price
stickiness in the economy by varying the rel-
ative sizes of the X and I’industries. The
nominal price of Ki sset to equate expected
quantities supplied and demanded. Asin the
case ofthe one-sector model, we assume that
output in the K industry is determined by the
quantity demanded. An interestingfeature
ofthis setup is that it encompasses thestan-
dard Keynesian model and the flexible-price
neoclassical model as special cases.
We begin with the economy in a
nonstochastic, steady-state equilibrium with
a constantmoney supply and consider an
unanticipated, permanent change in the
nominal money supply at the beginning of
period i. Real variables dated at t+1 and later
are unaffected by this change in the money
supply, hut real variables at date i change
because P~. is pre-determined. Suppose the
money supply falls permanently by 1 percent
at date i, with /1<, fixed for one period. Because
the quantity ofK produced is determined
by the quantity demanded, equation 25
(describing the supply ofK) does not hold
in the short run. Instead, we have equations
22-24 and 26 in the four variables Lk,, L,.,,
P~.and A,, (with A,/, taking its new steady-
state value). Because a change in the money
supply has no steady-state effect on x,y or
equation 23 implies that it has no steady-state
effect on ~ Therefore, since the fall
in the moneysupply lowers ~ by 1 percent,
it necessarilyraises A,:3 by 1 percent.
Tables 1-4 present the quantitative effects
of apermanent 1 percent rise in the money
supply (from 10.0 to 10.1) when u= 0.5,
0=0.64, V= 1,/3=0.99andp=2. Wechoose
the elasticity of substitution between x andy
(a = 0.5) to be less than the Cobb-Douglas
case (a = 1) since it seems reasonable to assume
that the short-run substitutability between the
two categories of goods maybe relatively low
The value chosen for the production parameter,
Benchmark Case
Old 5$ SR New SS Ratio
4.167 3.701 4.167 0.41
px 7925 7925 8.004 099
py 7.975 8012 8.004 0.10
labor in X 0.4869 04924 0.4869 0.13
labor in Y 0.4869 0.4882 0.4869 0.2/
Output of X 0.6309 0.6355 0.6309 0./2
Output of V 0.6309 0.6320 0.6309 0.1/
GNP 1.262 1.26/ 1.262 045
Toto~labor 0.9138 0.980/ 0.9/38 0/0
Very Small Sticky-Price Sector
(0 = 0.64), is often used in the equilibrium
business cycle literature, and is identical to the
value used in the one-sector model. We select
overall curvature ofthe utility function (p = 2)
that is consistent with empirical estimates, and
is also identical to the value used in the one-
sector model. Also, Vis a leisure preference
parameter and does not play an important
role for the experiments we conduct.3
The first column shows the variables of
interest: the nominal one-period interest rate
(in percent); the nominal prices of K and Y;
labor input in each industry; output in each
indusuy; real GNP evaluated atthe equilibrium
prices and production shares; and the total
labor input. The second column displays the
old steady-state (Old SS) levels of these vari-
ables,before the change in money The SR
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Old $5 SR New 5$ Ratio
4167 4057 4167 011
px 5.346 5346 54 099
py 1074 1085 1085 002
LobottnX 01044 0.1053 01044 086
labor in V 0.7248 07252 07248 0.06
Output ofI 02355 02368 02355 0.55
Otntputof V 0.81 38 0.8141 0.8138 0.04
GNP 0.9939 0.9943 0.9939 0.04
Totollobor 0.8291 0.8305 0.8291 0.16
1 We have analyzed specifications
with different preferences over
leisure, and tie results are qualita’
tirely similar to those reported
below. for example, if preferences
are logarithmic in leisure, the effect
of a money shock on interest rates
is about 70 percent as large as in






Old 55 SR New 55 Ratio
i 4.16/ 3.861 4.16/ 0.31
px 7.032 7.032 7.103 0.99
py 8.95 9.045 9.04 0.06
labor in X 0.3191 0.3223 0.3191 1.01
lobo: in V 0.6235 0.6246 0.6235 0.18
Output of 1 04814 0.4845 0.4814 0.65
Output of V 0/391 0/399 0.7391 011
OMP 1.205 1.208 1.205 024
Total labor 09426 0 9469 0.9426 0.46
Smaller Elasticity of
lntertemporal Substitution
Old $5 SR New SS Ratio
4167 3.6 4.167 057
px 6137 6137 6199 100
py 8103 8139 8184 006
labor neI 03546 0.3582 0.3546 100
labor in 1 0.7672 0.7685 0.7672 017
Outputofx 0.5151 0.6183 0.5151 0.64
Output of 1 0.844 0.8449 0.844 0.11
BNP 1.337 1.339 1.331 0.21
Totollobor 1.122 1.127 1.122 0.43
column shows the short-run effects of the
1 percent rise in money (while the nominal
price of Ki sfixed at its previous level). The
fourth column (New SS) shows the new steady
state, and the column labeled ratio displays
the percentage by which a variable falls short
of, or exceeds, its new steady-state level. For
the interest rate, this column shows thediffer-
ence between the short-run and steady-state
interest rates.
Table 1 shows the results when a = 0.5,
so that the sticky-price sectorrepresents half of
the economy’s output and half of all labor is
employed in the sticky-price sectoL A perma-
nent 1 percent rise in the money supply is
neutral in the long run, with a 1 percent rise in
nominal prices and no effects on real variables.
But in the short run, with p,~ pre-determined,
real GNP rises about 0.45 percent. There are
significant differences across sectors: Output
in the sticky-price sector rises 0.72 percent,
while output in the flexible-price sector rises
0.17 percent. The rise in money raises the
nominal price of 11, which reduces the rela-
tive price of K. This raises the quantity of K
demanded and creates excess demand in the
K industry Since output ofKi sdetermined
by the quantity demanded, output of K rises.
Output of Y rises less because consumers
substitute into purchases ofX. (Ifthe elasticity
of substitution weregreater than 1, this sub-
stitution would be larger and the output of Y
would fail.) Notice that the nominal price of
Y rises by about asmuch as if theprice ofK
were flexible. It overshoots its long-run
equilibrium by one-tenth of 1 percent (it would
undershoot if the elasticity ofsubstitution
between K and Ywere greater than 1).
The rise in the money supply hasa
short-run “liquidity effect” on the nominal
interest rate. In Table 1, the nominalinterest
rate falls 47 basis points, from 4.17 percent
to 3.70 percent, in the short run. Because
expected inflation is positive (the CPI is
expected to rise another 0.50 percent), this
represents a fall in the real interest rate (mea-
sured in terms of the output bundle) of about
1 percentage point. Notice that the liquidity
effect occurs despite the introduction of
money through a cash-in-advance constraint,
which (when binding, as in these examples)
builds in a zero interest-elasticity of the
demand for money
Table 2 shows that a change in the
money supply can have asubstantial liquidity
effect on nominal and real interest rates in
the short run even if only asmall fraction of
the economy has sluggish prices. This table
presents results with the same parameter
values as in Table 1, butwith a = 0.04, so
that the sticky-price sector accounts for only
about 12 percent of employment. A perma-
nent 1 percent rise in money reduces the
nominal interest rate by about 12 basis points.
Table 3 shows that with p = 2, the liquidity
effect is somewhat smaller if one-third of
labor is employed in the sticky-price seetor~
If, however, the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is one-third (p = 3) rather than
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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one-half, the interest rate falls 57 basis points
when one-third of labor is employed in the
sticky-price sector (see Table 4). With p = 3,
the nominal interest rate falls 27 basis points
even if the sticky-price sector accounts for
only 15 percent ofemployment, andraising
p from 3t o4 further doubles the size of the
interest rate response, holding fixed the share
ofthe economy with sluggish prices.
These examples demonstrate that asig-
nificantliquidity effectis consistent with a
relatively small sticky-price sector. A further
analysis ofthe relationship between the size
ofthe sticky-price sector and the response of
interest rates to a money shock is presented
in Figure 5. This plot displays the (p, a)
combinations that generate the midpoint
estimate of the liquidity effectreported by
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992b), and
shows that reasonable values of p combined
with a small sticky-price sector are consistent
with their estimates for U.S. data. While the
size ofthe liquidity effect depends on the
parameterp, in all other respects the responses
ofthe economy to an increase in the money
supply arevirtually unaffected by changes in
the elasticity ofintertemporal substitution.4
A vcs=4.~unT~’ ModAl
In previous work, such as Stockman and
Ohanian (1994), we examined the effects of
money supply changes in atwo-country world
in which some sectors of the economy have
nominal prices that are stickyin the short run
and other sectors have flexible prices. We
showed that money supply changes have liq-
uidity effects (a fall in the money supply raises
thereal and nominal interest rate) both within
and across countries, and creates a cross-
country, real interest rate differential.
We discussed atwo-country model in
which each country produces and consumes
two internationally tradable goods, K and 1’,
using only labor as an input. There are two
monies introduced through cash-in-advance
constraints with theusual convention in which
sellers’currencies are the medium ofexchange
for all transactions. Because the two countries
areidentical cx ante, we describe only the
domestic counu~y:A representative household
in the home country maximizes
Rho/Alpha Pairs Yielding Estimated
(Midpoint) Liquidity Effects













subject to the sequence of budget constraints
(29) P~ ,_3k~ ,_3L~,_1
+ P~,_1k~ ,_,L~,_3
+v,(q, +d,) + r, — v,~3q, — M, e,N, = 0
and sequences ofthe two cash-in-advance
constraints,
(30) M, — min{~, , x3~
and
=0,
(31) N, — max{x, —
—max{y, —~,,o}~ =0,
where equation 29 is a budget constraint for
period-t asset markets and equations 30 and
31 are the cash-in-advance constraints that
apply to period-t product markets. The
terms x, and y, refer to total home consump-
SEDRRAL RESERVE RANK Of ST. LOUIS
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Relative importance of stickey price goads (alpba)
1 In future work, we plan tr analyze
liquidity affects in a version of this
hybrid model with capital occumala’




tions of excess supply, buyers purchase from
sellers in the country with the lowest price
(adjusted for the exchangerate). When prices
are equal in both countries, buyers purchase
first from sellers in their own country We
assume that in situations ofexcess demand
for a good in some country buyers residing
in that country are first in line andbuyers
from the other country are lastin line to
buy that good.’
Necessary conditions for home-currency
and foreign-currency bonds yield expressions
for one-period nominal interest rates like 2.10
that, along with the law ofone price for good
Y, I’~. = e1~,and interest parity imply:
(32) e, = e,+n 4’,
a Our previous pnper disrassesthe
various cuses involving ofternatire
corner solutons to the rotoning
problems that can arise in this
model.
don of goodsK and Y, regardless ofwhere
the goods were purchased, 5?, and 37, refer to
home production of the two goods, M, is the
home household’s stock ofhome money at
the beginning of the product market, N, is its
stock of foreign money used for purchasing
imports (if imports are positive), and e is the
exchange rate (in units of home money per
unit of foreign money).
We assume that assets cannot be traded
conditional on monetary transfers or taxes
(positive or negative d, so any decrease in
the home money supply is financed by lump-
sum taxes (negative ‘r) on households in the
home country only, and any decrease in the
foreign money supply directly affects only
foreign households. Assuming r’” 0,
where T~is the transFer or tax in the foreign
country, andk~,= kg,, = k1, = hr., = I for all t,
we showedthat one flexible-price equilibrium
is the same as in a closed economy with no
international trade or foreign money holding.
We assume that P~and P1,’ (the foreign-
currency nominal price of K produced and
sold in that country) are pre-determined,
chosen one period in advance. The nominal
prices P~ and p
1,
n, on the other hand, areflex-
ible. Assuming flexible exchange rates and
holding constant the foreign money supply
N’, we consider asmall, unanticipated, per-
manent fall in M’, (the home money supply)
starting from anonstochastic steady-state
equilibrium with constant money In situa-
where A.” is the multiplier on the foreign
representative household’s current-period
budget constraint. Equation 15 follows
directly from the usual expression of interest
parity (e’/e = (1+i)I(1+i”)) and the standard
asset-pricing equations for riskless nominal
one-period bonds in each currency In addi-
tion, we need the separate budget constraints
for home and Foreignhouseholds. The home
household can buy (or sell) one-period nominal
bonds B at the price 1/(1 + f).
Table 5 shows the effects ofa permanent,
unexpected, 2 percent fall in thehome country’s
moneysupply (from 10.0 to 9.8), starting from
a steady-state equilibrium with a constant
money supply and price level. We hold fixed
the foreign money supply in this initial exercise
and assume a = 0.5, a = 0.5, 8 = 0.9, V = 1,
= 0.99 and p = 2. This implies that halfof
GDP in each country consists ofoutput ofgood
Y, the relative price of YintermsofKi sinitially
unity the exchange rate is initially 1, and the
real (and nominal) interest rate is 11/3 — 1.
Since a< 1, the two goods are relatively poor
substitutes. We also assume there is no initial
international indebtedness, so initially the
countries areidentical and there is no interna-
tional trade. (After a change in the money
supply in one country—or in both—B can
become non-zero and can remain non-zero
in the new steady state.)
The first column ofTable 5 shows the
endogenous variables: the nominal price of Y
fEDERAL RESERVE RANK Of ST. LOUIS




to New 55 Old SS
I 1.01 1.537 1.01 0.52
ii 1.01 1.48 1.01 0.46





























in the home and foreign countries (py andpyfI;
the nominal interest rate (in percent) in the
home and foreign countries (i and ifl; the
exchange rate (e);labor inputs in thexindusuy
in the home and foreign countries (be and lx,f);
andlabor inputs in they industries in thehome
and Foreigncountries (fy and 14). The second
column, Old SS, shows the old steady-state
levels of the variables (before the change in
money) from which theanalysis begins. The SR
column shows the short-run effectsof the fall
in money (while thenominalprice ofKi sfixed
atits previous level for one period). The NewSS
column shows the new steady state, and the
column labeled percent shows the percentage
by which avariable falls short of or exceeds its
new steady-state level. For the interest rate,
this column presents the difference between
interest rates in the short run and in the new
steady state.
The 2 percent fall in money leads, in the
long run (New SS column), to a 2 percent
fall in the nominal prices ofgoods K and Y,
from 7.333 to 7.187. (The new steady-state
relative price of Y in terms of K is I, so the
new price ofX is also 7.187.) The interest
rate is unaffected in the long run by the one-
time change in the level of money and the
exchange rate falls 2 percent, From 1.00 to
0.98, in the long run. Long-run levels of
employment in each industry in the home
country (lx and ly) are unaffected, as are for-
eign employment levels in each industry (fxf
and lyf) and long-run levels of output in
each industry and in each country
While the unexpected change in money
is almost neutral in the long run (“ainnost”
because it redistributes wealth and so has
permanent effects), it is not neutral in the short
nan. The impact effect of the unexpected fall
in home money is to raise the home-country
nominal interest rate by 53 basis points. If
one interprets this as a quarterly model (since
the discount parameter is 0.99 perperiod),
with one-quarter nominal price stickiness in
the K industry then the steady-state interest
rate is 1.01 percent per quarter, or 4.04 percent
per year. Then the 2 percent fall in home
money raises the annualized home nominal
interest rate by 2i I basis points, to 6.15 per-
cent per year. The foreign nominal interest
rate also rises, by 47 basis points, on aper-
thAi (1 ri no
Home and Foreign Money Fall
from lOto9.8
Percentage Excess









period basis, which is 188 basis points on an
annualized basis with this interpretation. The
home nominal interest rate is then 20 basis
points above the foreign rate on an annualized
basis. This is reflected also in a slight over-
shooting of the exchange rate in the short rten
(it falls 0.05 percent below0.98) followed by
a small, expected (and actual) appreciation
ofhome currency Employment in the home
country falls in both industries, particularly
in the K industry with sticky prices. Overall
output is unchanged in the foreign country
though there is a small sectoral reallocation
of production from the K industry to the Y
industry
The short-run appreciation of home cur-
rency combined with the stickiness ofboth
the home-money price ofK sold at home and
the foreign-money price ofK sold abroad,
implies that K is cheaper in the foreign country
than in the home country, creating excess
demand for Kin the foreign country and excess
supply in the home country Foreigners are
unconstrained in buying good K in their own
countryand home residents, who are last in
line there, import Kand buy the rest from
sellers in their own country.
Table 6 shows the case in which both
countries reduce their money supplies by the
same percentage. The result is the same in
each country as in aclosed economy and
there is no international trade in either the
short run or in the new steady state. The table
shows theeffects ofan unexpected, permanent,
2 percent fall in money in both countries.
This has identical effects in the two countries,











Foreign Money Falls to 9.7,
then to 9.80098; Home











so we can discuss only the home country
The fall in money reduces aggregate nominal
spending, which reduces the nominal price
ofgood Y. Because is fixed in the short
run, this increases the relative price of K, so
consttmers substitute good Y for good K, which
further reduces output of K and works against
the fall in spending on Y. Ifthe elasticity of
substitution in consumption, a, were l,out-
put in the Y sector would remain unchanged
and the nominal price ofYwould fall by 2
percent. With a < 1, output of Y falls along
with output ofK and P,, overshoots itslong-
run fall. (Ifa> 1, output ofY rises and its
nominal price undershoots its long-run fall.)
One way for the foreign country to peg
its exchange rate (in the absence ofany other
shocks) is to change its money supply in
proportion to the change in the home money
supply; in this model, thereare other paths of
monetary policy that also result in a pegged
exchange rate. But these policies have vastly
different effects on real and nominal interest
rates.
Suppose the home country’smoney supply
falls by 2percent as before, and suppose the
foreign country pegs its exchange rate atunity
Suppose also that the foreign government can
credibly commit to a future path for the money
supply Because nominal prices are set one
period in advance, for only one period, antic-
ipated future changes in money can be fully
incorporated into price-setting behavior.
Table 7 shows the results ofa foreign mone-
Foreign Money Falls to 9.85,
then to 9.79952; Home











tarypolicy that reduces the foreign money
tipply by 3 percent from M”’= 10 to M”’= 9.7
in the short run (while the home money sup-
ply, falls from 10 to 9.8), and then changes
M” to 9.80098 in the long run, assuming that
a = 0.5, a= 0.5,6 = 0.9, u= 1, /3= 0.99 and
p = 2, as in Table 5. The exchange rate remains
at exactly 1, but the rise in world interest
rates of 203 basis points exceedsthe 100 basis
point rise that occurs along the baseline path.
Table 8 shows the results when thefor-
eign money supply falls tess than the baseline
case: It falls from 10 to 9.85 For one period
and then permanently goes to 9.79952 (while
home money falls to 9.8). We continue to
assume a = 0.5, a= 0.5,6=0.9, ~=i, /3 = 0.99
and p = 2. If the fall to 9.85 were permanent,
foreign currency would depreciate and K
would be cheaper in theforeign country. This
would add to excess supply for K in the home
country and reduce excess supply of Ki n the
foreign country This occurs up to the point
at which the relative price is unity that is, at
an unchanged exchange rate. In this case,
the rise in world interest rates is smaller (49
basis points) than in the baseline case, and
similar to the rise in Table 5, even though
the size ofthe change in the money supply is
different. Finally Table 9 shows the results
when the foreign money supply falls even
less in the short run—from 10 to 9.9 before
permanently going to 9.79904. In this case,
there is no nominal liquidity effect (though the
real interest rate falls). Ifthehome money
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Foreign Money Falls to 9.90,
then to 9.79904; Home
Money Falls to 9.8
supply falls by only 0.5 percent in the short
run, but the exchange rate is pegged by a
commitment to future policy then thenomi-
nal interest rate actuallyfalls in each country
(though, again, the real rate rises).
These tables illustrate that real and
nominal interest rates do not depend solely
on domestic monetary policy Foreign policy
and expected future domestic and foreign
policies can create significant changes in the
responses of both real and nominal interest
rates. In particular, even the sign of the interest
rate response to domestic monetary policy
depends on foreign monetary policy In
addition, the response of nominal interest
rates to changes in the money supply is highly
nonlinear. That nonlinearity illustrated by
these tables, suggests that linear statistical
analysis may miss key features of the rela-
tions between money and interest rates.
bawcuiy Effects, Increosin-c Returns
~ C ttJ~-cC- D’r~
A very different model with sticky prices
has been analyzed by Beaudry and Devereux
(forthcoming). An infinitely lived represen-
tative household maximizes discounted
expected utility:
(33) Max EoEfl’(ln(c~)_tin,).
Beaudry and Devereux make use ofthe
Rogerson-Hansen construct, which implies
that the utility function for the representative
household islinear in leisure.
Final goods, Y, are produced from an
isoelastic technology usingintennediate inputs,
cO 0
(34) Y=[Jm(i~t)di]
where m(i) is the amount of intermediate
input used in theproduction of final goods;
& represents the measure of intermediate
goods-producing firmsand is fixed exoge-
nously Intermediate-goods firms produce
output from an increasing returns-to-scale
technology that uses capital and labor,
(35) m(i,t) =
where the degree ofincreasing returns is
indexed by y; z, is an exogenous technology
shock and the log ofz is assutned to follow
arandom walk. Money plays a very different
role in this economy relative to the other
models discussed in this article. Households
have no demand for money in this economy;
instead, cash is held bybanks because it
reduces intermediation costs. Banks accept
deposits from households and lend to inter-
mediate-goods producers, who must finance
capital inputs before selling their product to
final-goods producers. The representative
bank’s intermediation cost function is assumed
to be isoelastic in real balancesarid deposits:
BH]DT.
It is assumed that r> 1,so that costs are
reduced by acquiring real balances. Banks
are owned by households and maximize the
present discounted value ofcash flows,
(37) MaxEQ,(S3CF(S,)dS,
where f2 is a state-contingent pricing func-
tion and CF is the bank’s cash flow.
Final-goods producers are price takers,
but intermediate-goods producers are
monopolistic competitors. The increasing
returns parameter y plays afundamental














role. In models with substantial increasing
returns, there is a continuum ofstationary
equilibria. This occurs because, with large
enough increasing returns, the eigenvalues
governing the policy functions are both out-
side the unit circle and the model no longer
has the standard saddlepath property Since
there are multiple equilibria, the authors
choose the equilibrium in which nominal
prices do not respond to current innovations
to money or technology Sticky prices in this
economy have amuch different implication
than in standard sticky-price setups. In con-
ventional sticky-price models, nominal prices
would change in response to monetary or
technology innovations if that were possible.
In the Beaudry and Devereux economy how-
ever, there is no cx post regret in that no pro-
ducer has an incentive to change his price
after shocks are revealed. Monetary and tech-
nology shocks generate substantial changes
in economic activity in this model. In partic-
ular, there are large and persistent increases
in output, consumption and investment in
response to either type ofshock. Moreover,
an unanticipated increase in money leads to
a significant and prolonged reduction in the
nominal interest rate. With strong increasing
returns, this is one of the few models that
has internal propagation mechanisans capable
ofgenerating persistent liquidity effects.
However, the model generates only a nominal
liquidity effect and not a real liquidity effect.
In fact, monetary expansion raises the real
interest rate in this nnodel. (Because prefer-
ences are separable over consumption and
leisure, marginal utility of consumption
depends only on date t consumption, so a
rising real rate is implied by the consumption-
Euler equation.) So the fall in the nominal
rate is due entirely to substantial, persistent
deflation induced by the monetary shock.
The channel through which money
affects real quantities in this model differs
significantly from the monetary transmission
mechanisms in the other models discussed
in this article. In fact, an increase in the
anoney stock in this economy is isomorphic
to a favorable technology shock that affects
financial intermediaries. An increase in the
stock of money combined with sticky prices,
results in higher real balances and raises the
productivity of the banking sector. Lower
intermediation costs, with strong increasing
returns, lead to the substantial increase in
output that occurs in this model.
The striking feature of this model is that
small monetary shocks lead to significant and
persistent liquidity effects, as well as large,
persistent increases in real qttantities. Of
course, the very strong internal propagation
mechanisms in the model that make these
phenomena occur have not been established.
Largeincreasing returns are required in this
economy which raises anumber of questions.
Ifactual production technologies exhibit
economies ofscale in this range, we would
expect to see greater temporal concentration
ofproduction (periods ofvery high production,
followed by periods ofno production). The
volatility ofoutput, consumption, investment
and labor input in this increasing-rewrns
model is almost surely much greater than the
corresponding volatility in the data. In addi-
tion, this model suggests large profits (or
high per-period fixed costs) for business
enterprises that are not obviously evident in
the data. Finally with even a small interest
elasticityof money demand, the model would
imply a large effect on capital accumulation,
output and other variables of a change in
secular inflation, because a rise in inflation
would operate like a tax on financial inter-
mediation (analogous to anegative monetary
shock in their model).
The nominal liquidity effect and inverse
real liquidity effect implied by this model
reflect the fact thatan increase in the money
stock leads immediately to a sharp deflation.
Of course, the standard interpretation of liq-
uidity effects is that monetary increases are
associatedwith lower nominal and real inter-
est, rates, andit is perhaps not surprising that
a model in which an increase in the nominal
money stock leads to a future increase in the
nominal value ofmoney reduces nominal
interest rates. Though some vector autore-
gressions suggest that nominal prices do not
immediately increase in response to a mone-
tary shock, it is not yet an established empir-
ical fact that higher money leads to a falling
price level over horizons corresponding to
business cycle frequencies, as is the case in
the Beaudry and Devereux model.




It is reasonably well established that
short-term interest rates rise prior to reces-
sions. These correlations have been inter-
preted asimportant evidence for the exis-
tence ofsignificant liquidity effects, and for
monetary business cycle models. In this sec-
tion, we consider avery simple equilibrium
model in which increasesin nominal interest
rates precede economic downturns, but the
correlations between nominal interest rates
and future changes in output are due to an
exogenous shock. This model is used to
illustrate in a simple way that there are alter-
native interpretations of these correlations
that are consistent with neoclassical economic
theory and observations.
This section is drawn from Cooley and
Ohanian (1990). Consider arepresentative
household with preferences given by:
(38) MaxE~/3 c~-1
Consumers maximize the expected pre-





and the cash-in-advance (asset market) con-
straint:
(40) R~b~ + in1
+ ~~ +
Thebudget constraint states that con-
sumer wealth, which consists of nominal
money holdings (ni) alump-sum monetary
transfer (i), interest and principal on one-
period bonds (R,b). and the value of equity,
z~ (q1 +pd), must be sufficient to finance
consumption (c1) new money (m1~,), new
one-period debt (b1,) and new equity (z,÷q).
The price level for the economy is given by Pr
The equilibrium for this model is straightfor-
ward: Consumption of the representative
agent must be equal to the endowment (d),
the equilibrium prices ofequity andbonds
insure that the agent is willing to hold equity;
and there is no incentive for an agent to
issue debt.
For current purposes, we assume initially
that money grows deterministically:
(41) m~1 =G1M, C 1.
The endowment process is stochastic,
and is the only source of uncertainly in this
model. One-period debt is specified as sure
nomina] debt: One dollar today yields R dol-
lars tomorrow, R i. Since this is a repre-
sentative-agent economy, this security wifl be
in zero-net supply but the asset can be priced




For analytical convenience, we assume
that the endowment is generated by a log-
normal distribution. This implies that the
one-period interest rate is given by:
(43) ln(R) = — ln($) — (1—a)2 var(Aln(c~i))
+ln(G1÷i) +(a — l)F[Aln(c~1 )],
where Aln(c1,) is defined as the growth rate
ofconsumption between today and tomorrow
Suppose that the log ofthe endowment
follows an integrated process:
(44) ln(c,~)= a + ln(c1 ) +
where b(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator
11. and is square summable, and S is an i.i.d.
random variable with F(s) = 0, F(s2) = u2.
Defining dk = Eb, it can be shown that
the one-period nominal interest rate in this
economy is given by:
(1-
(45) ln(R) = —ln($) — 2+ (a—l)a
— dh)s~~]
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lovenovic (1982) presentsa muted
node).
Note that in this economy, the nominal
interest rate necessarily rises prior to areces-
sion if the risk-aversion coefficient (a) is less
than 1. This is because ifthe economy is at a
cyclical peak, then the term
[tdt+n _ak)ES~k]<0:
Moreover, if one compares thespread between
short- and long-term debt, then it is also the
case that the yield curve necessarily inverts
prior to a recession, and this is astrong feature
of the data. The explanation for this is due
to expected inflation. Ifhouseholds antici-
pate the endowment to fallnext period, there
are two forces at work on the interest rate.
First, given the constant growth rate rule for
money, higher expected inflation tends to
push up the nominal rate. A falling endow-
ment, however, implies that the real rate will
fall. Ifrisk aversion is less than unity, then
inflation risk is more important than endow-
ment risk, and the interest rate rises prior to
a downturn.
Of course, the price level in this model
is countercyclical; high price levels (and infla-
tion rates) are associated with low endowment
states. But as Kydland and Prescott (1990)
and Cooley and Ohanian (1990) have pointed
out, the price level in the United States is
strongly countercyclical over the postwar
period. The predictions of this simple model
are also in line with observations reported by
Fama (1981) regarding a negative associa-
tion between stock returns and inflation.
As an extension, this model could be
used to interpret an even richer set of corre-
lations that has been reported (for example,
Christiano and Eichenbaum. 1992a) in which
open market sales (Federal Reserve tightening),
high interest rates and subsequent downturns
occur. This would simply require price level
smoothing on the part of the Fed. For exam-
ple, suppose that individuals expect a fall in
the endowment, and a corresponding rise in
the inflation rate (in the absence ofany change
in monetary policy). Ifthe Fed is interested
in pursuing price level smoothing, then the
Fed would conduct open market sales of
securities to reduce the amount ofcash in
the economy, and lower the future price level.
As long as the Fed did not (or was unable to)
completely smooth price-level fluctuations,
we would observe Fed tightening, higher
nominal interest rates, and future output
declines. The behavior of the money supply,
however, would be entirely endogenous.
This model illustrates how observations
that are often interpreted as results of the hq-
uidity effect can have very different explana-
tions consistent with neoclassical models.
While it isunlikely that real shocks account
entirely for the observed correlations between
nominal interest rates, the money stock and
output, giventhe strongcountercyclical behav-
ior of the price level, it is not at all unreason-
able to expect that this mechanism is respon-




refer to a class of models, originally proposed
independently by Rotemberg (1984) and
Grossman and Weiss (1983), and later devel-
oped further by Lucas (1990).6 These models
provide an alternative interpretation of liq-
uidity effects. While the sticky-price models
discussed above all imply that assets canhe
priced by using consumption-Euler equations,
so that the e[fects ofa monetary disturbance
on the time path of consumption determines
whether there is areal liquidity effect (as
well as how large it is and how long it lasts),
limited-participation models provide a means
ofbreaking thehnkbetween consumption-
Euler equations and real interest rates.
The basic economics ofthe limited-
participation theory can be illustrated with
a modified versionof the Grossman and Weiss
model with logarithmic utility Households
are staggered in their visits to financial mar-
kets. Evens” visit financial markets in even-
numbered periods and “Odds” visit in odd-
numbered periods. It takes time for people
to exhaust their money balances, so most peo-
ple do not participate in financial markets
continuously At any point in time, some are
in financial markets and some are out of
financial markets. As in cash-in-advance
models, households must use cash to buy
goods, but in this model households spend
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their money over two periods rather than
one. Also as in cash-in-advance models, each
period consists of an asset market(AM) fol-
lowed by aproduct market (PM).
A nonstochastic steady-state equilibrium
in the Grossman and Weiss model can be
described asfollows. At period-one asset
markets, Odds obtain money for spending
dnring product markets in periods one and
two. Then, at period-one product markets,
Odds spend a fraction 4,of their money on
goods, where 4, = 1/(1+/3) and /3 is the dis-
count rate, and save the remaining fraction
(1 —4,) of their money to spend during the
second period. At the same time, in period-
one product markets, Evens spend all the
money they have left, which is afraction 4, of
the money they had acquired last period (in
period-zero asset markets). This will be utili-
ty-maximizing behavior for households with
separable logarithmic utility and aconstant
discount rate facing constant nominal prices
and opportunities to hold only money and
riskless one-period nominal bonds as assets.
Consider asteady state in which Odds
and Evens are equally wealthy and have the
same consumption profiles (except that they
are out of phase by aperiod). In asteady state
with a fixed nominal money supply, M5, and
with constant endowments of goods,y = 1,
equilibrium nominal prices are constantand
total nominal spending on goods each period
is (1I(2—4,))M5,while ((1—
money is not spent (because it is carried over
to the next period by the households that will
not be in asset markets next period).
Starting from this steady state, an unan-
ticipated open market purchase has real effects
in the short run: The increase in money must
initially be acquiredby those households that
are in asset markets when it occurs. Suppose
the open market operation occurs in an odd
period, so odd households initially acquire it
all (by selling bonds for money). Because all
households spend cash slowly (over two
periods), not all the new money is spent at
first. The price level rises less-than-propor-
tionally to the money supply Because Even
households (who did not attend financial
markets this period) planned already to spend
all their money on goods, the increase in the
price level reduces their consumption. With
constant endowments, equilibrium requires
that Odd households consume more this
period. However, this increase in consump-
tion by Odd households is temporary, so the
anticipated growth rate of the Odd household’s
consumption falls. The consumption-Euler
equation for Odd households then implies
that the real interest rate over two periods
(from now until the Odd household again
enters assetsmarkets) falls. Notice, however,
that the model breaks the link between real
interest rates and the consumption-Euler
equation of Even households, so it breaks
the link between real interest rates and the
path ofaggregate consumption.
Moreprecisely, there are equal numbers
of Odd and Even households. Oddhouseholds
choose consumptions, c~,andwithdrawals of
money from financial markets (every other
period), M~,to maximize
(46) ~I3~—~ ln(c~),
subject to asequence of constraints




B, (48) B1” +P~= + L2 +r1 for todd, (1 +
and initial conditions on Bd’, the initial level
of “bonds” held by the representative Odd
household, andP~,the period-zero price level;
y is alump-sum tax payment that the house-
hold must pay (to balance the government
budget). Odd household own claims on the
endowment streams of firms: They are enti-
tled to the dividends paid by the firm during
asset markets at odd-numbered periods (from
sales in the product market at the previous
even-numbered periods). Firms pay their
entire revenue as dividends. The term
shows the money that the Odd household
acquires during asset markets at date 1 for
use in product markets at dates 1 and 2.
This money comes from dividends paid by
firms from their sales of goods at date-zero
product markets. Notice that utility maxi-
mization implies that f~ = 4,M1°and
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P,,, ~ = (1—4CM,°. Even households
solve an analogous maximization problem.
The government collects lump-sum taxes
anduses the proceeds as interest on its debt;
the representative household has a tax hability
equal to the present value of the total gov-
ernment debt. The government may also
engage in openmarket operations. The
government’s budget constraint is
(49) M~—M~,+ +r, =15,
1+iu+a
which says that the government finances it
debt obligations by printing money or by
borrowing from or imposing lump-sum taxes
on households currently in asset markets. In
thesteady state, this budget constraintbecomes
simply r= (i/U+fi)B5. The initial level of
government bonds is given exogenously
Equilibrium requires asequence of
prices andinterest rates so that households





(51) M~= I~,+M~ — M~, fort even,
(52) M~= I~, + M~— M~, for t odd.
The latter conditionsrequire that households in
financial markets acquire all the money paid by
firms as dividends that period plus any new
money printed by the government.
Consider the following sequence of events
in a steady-state equilibrium with fixed money
supply M. In each odd period t, therepresen-
tative Odd household acquires money
(1/(2—4fi)M atasset markets and then spends
(4)I(2—4)))Min product markets, saving
(U — ó)/(2—40)M to spend next period. The
representative Even household spends all its
remaining money ((1—4fi/(2—4)))M, on
goods. Total nominal spending on goods is
(I/(2—4)))M. In each even period, the repre-
sentative Even household acquires money
(1/(2—4fi)Mat asset markets and then spends
(4)/(2—4)))M in product markets, saving
((1—cb)I(2—40)M to spend next period.
The representative Odd household spends
all its remaining money ((1—4fi1(2—4)))M.
Again, total nominal spending on goods is
(1I(2—4)))M. This sequence repeats in the
steady state. Because output is unity the
steady-state nominalprice levelis (11(2— 4fi)M.
Now consider aparametric change in
the money supply at date 1, starting from
this nonstochastic steady state. Thegovern-
ment buys aone-period bond (from the Odd
household) with newly printed money The
Odd household now has (1I(2—4fi)M+AM
dollars and spends 4)((1I(2—4i))M+ AM) on
goods. The Even household still has
(U—4fi/(2—4C7lMdollars to spend. Total





With 4) e I, the price level rises but
falls short of its new steady-state value of
(1I(2—4)))(M+ AM). This rise in the price
level reduces the real consumption ofEven
households from 1—4’ to ((1—4fi1(2—4fi)MI
((1I(2—4fi)M+ AM). Equilibrium real con-
sumption ofOdd households rises by the
amount that Even household consumption
falls.
The following period (t = 2), Even
households acquire all the money that was
spent at t = 1 and spend a fraction 4’ ofit,
so they spend çt~ (1/(2—ç6YIM+ 4’AM].
Odd households spend their remaining
(1—çb)((1/(2—4’))M+ AM) on goods, so
total nominal spending (and the price level)
is (1/(2—4fi)M+ (4)2+1—4’)AM. With
~/2 4’ C I, the price level rises at t = 2 and
overshoots its new steady-state level. The
price level then falls below its steady-state
level at t = 3 and shows damped oscillations
as it approaches its new steady state. (The
subsequent adjustment of the price level can
be described by the difference equation,
= 4)P,, + (1—
Equilibrium real interest rates can he
computed in this model from consumption-
Euler equations. Consumption by Odd
households rises at t = 1 (when the open
market purchase occurs), then falls at t = 2
(as Even households go to asset markets and
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acquire the portion of the new money that
Odd households spent at I = 1). The two-
period change in consumption for Odd
households is also negative, as the economy
approaches (with two-period oscillations) its
new steady state. So the two-period market
real interest rate falls at t = I, and the implicit
one-period real interest rate from the con-
sumption-Euler equations of Odd households
also falls. This is the liquidity effect of mon-
etary expansion in the basic limited-partici-
patiota model. Notice that because con-
sumption ofEven households falls at t = I,
the implicit one-period real interest rate from
their consumption-Euler equations rises at
= 1, but this is not reflected in any market
interest rates because these households are
not currently participating in asset markets,
At t = 2. the two-period market real interest
rate rises above its steady-state level because
the two-period change in consumption of
Even households is positive. So the liquidity
effectin the limited-participation model is
necessarily of limited duration: It vanishes
(and in fact reverses itself) when the identity
of the participants changes.
The liquidity effect from the limited-par-
ticipation model results from the temporary
change in consumption of the households
who have use ofa disproportionate share of
newly printed money In the simple model
discussed above, these households cannot
use this money to finance a perananent
increase in consumption. More generally
the increase in money may raise liquidity (in
the model above, relax the two-period, cash-
in-advance constraint) by more than it raises
wealth, so households that obtain the addi-
tional money may choose an increase in con-
sumption that,is (at least partly) temporary
Although in equilibrium other households
must then experience a temporary fall in
consumption, the limited-participation
nature of the tnodel breaks the link between
interest rates and the consumption-Euler
equations of those households.
Representcitwc t-tcvsehofri LimitS-
Per5c2jfic,n 1RRLP~Mother
l_imited-participation models arc com-
plicated because they involve heterogeneity
Lucas (1990) and Fuerst (1992) developed
variations on the limited-participation model
that simplify it by using arepresentative
household, thereby eliminating wealth-redis-
tribution effects. Their models go further
than the heterogenous-agent LP model dis-
cussed above by eliminating the connection
between real interest rates and any consumnp-
tion-Euler equation. The models split the
representative household into individuals
with unique tasks who laterpool wealth and
consumption. One person in the household
purchases goods with money while another
participates in financial markets and receives
new money transfers. The new money in
the hands of the latter person, cannot imme-
diately reach the former person and is there-
fore not available for immediate spending in
the goods market. As aresult, nominal
goods prices do not immediately reflect the
newmoney (Withabinding cash-in-
advance constraint in the goods market,
nominal prices do not depend at all on the
size of the current monetary transfer,) In
this way the model generates short-run price
stickiness in response to unanticipated
increases in the money supply The new
money introduced into the economy enters
the loans market as firms must use money to
pay inputs. l-Iouseholds work for money they
can use to buy goods next period. Because
they know that nominal prices will risc next
period, the nominal reservation wage rises in
proportion to that increase in prices. This
raises the nonainal amount ofmoney the firm
must borrow to paywages. However, because
a disproportionate share ofnew money is
used in this factor market (rather than being
spread throughout all markets that require
money), the real interest rate falls.
Although the model is simpler than the
LP model in that there is a representative
household, its timing and household splits
add new complications. We describe here
only the setup of a basic RHLP model (read-
ers are referred to the papers by Lucas and
Fuerst for discussions ofthe model’ssolution
and implications). The basic model hassev-
eral steps. First, households start each period
with all the economy’s money while firms
will hold all the economy’s auoney at the end
of each period. Initially households divide
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money between buying goods and lending
to financial firms: They lend D, dollars to
financial firms and keep M,— D, dollars to
spend on goods. Second, financial firms
receive alump-sum transfer, r~,from the
government. Third, financial finns lend
their money D, + r,, to goods-producing
firms. Fourth, goods-producing firms use
some or all ofthis cash to pay w,L, for labor
services (in a perfectly competitive labor
market) because labor services are subject
to a cash-in-advance constraint. Fifth,
goods-producing firms producef(h,, z,L,)
goods using this labor and (previously
installed) capital; they decide how many
goods to install as capital for next period,
I,, and how many to sell to households in a
perfectly competitive environment. Sixth,
goods-producing firms sellf(k,, z,F,) — I,
goods to households for M,— D, dollars.
Seventh, goods-producing firms repay (with
interest) their loans from financial firms:
They pay (D, + r~ Xl + I,) to financial firms.
Eighth, goods-producing firms paydivi-
dends,H,, to households with all their
remaining money:
(54) u, = M, —D, —U-), +t~)(1+i,)
+ D, + t, — w,L,.
Finally financial firms pay interest of (1+ i,)D,
to households on their loans, and dividends
to households with all their remaining money
(D,+r,)(1+i,)—(l+i,)D,. Sothetotal
amount of money that financial firms pay
to households at this point is (1+ ~,)D, +
(D, + m~)U+ I,). After this payment, house-
holds have money balances of M, + ~, which
come from four sources: interest on loans to
financial firms; wage income; dividends from
goods-producing firms; and dividends from
financial firms.
The representative household chooses
consumption, labor supply and deposits to
maximize expected utility
(55) F,Efl’~’[U(c,.1 — F,)~ Info,].
‘=0
subject to asequence of budget constraints:
(56) M,÷, = M, +fl, +u +i,D, +w,L, —I~c,,
where fl and u, are the nominal dividends
paid at the end ofperiod t by goods-producing
firmsand financial firms, M, is beginning-of-
period money balances, i,D, is the interest
the household earns on its deposits at finan-
cial finns, w,L, is labor income, and P,c, is
nominal spending on consumption goods.
This budget constraint can be rewritten as
(57) M,~, = M, +
+ 1~[f(h,,z,L3—h,+,—c,],
where i~is the nominal lump-sum transfer of
new money to the representative financial
firm andf(h,,z,L,) — h,.,, is output of goods
minus investment spending by the represen-
tative goods-producing firm. (This formula-
tion assumes 100 percent depreciation of
capital each period.) The household is also
subject to a sequence of cash-in-advance
constraints:
(58) P~c, M, ~Dr
Households must choose labor supply and
deposits for date tprior to the realization of
uncertainty at date t, but can choose con-
sumption after the resolution ofuncertainty
at that date.




where LT~,+,is the representative household’s
marginal utility of consumption at date I,
P,4., is the price level at date t+ 1, and Info, is
the firm’sinformation set at date t. The fir-
m’s production function depends on capital,
labor and aproductivity shock, z,, so pro-
duction isf(h,,L,, z,). Nominal profit equals
nominal income from sales, P f(h,, F,, z,),
minus expenditure for investment, P, ‘a,.,,,
minus expenditure for labor, w,L,:
(60) ~, = 1~f(h,,L,,z,)— ~ —w,L,.
The representative financial firm
acquires loans (deposits) D, from households
by paying interest i,, receives alump-sum
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transfer i~from the government, and lends B,
to goods-producing firms at the interest rate
i,. It chooses loans and deposits to maximize
(61) F~E$’+’[~L0÷1v~ Info~]
where its nominal dividends u, are given by
(62) = r, +i,B, —1,13,.
Note that the total amount a financial firm
pays to households at the end ofa period
equals dividends plus interest payments,
or T~+i,B,.
The basic idea of the model above is
similar to the limited-participation models
of Rotemherg (1984) and Grossman and
Weiss (1.983). In this model, all households
fully participate in financial markets, but
monetary transfers enter through credit
markets (in the sense that they go to financial
firms, which then lend the money) and
households cannot use this new money to
buy consumption goods. This breaks the
link between consumption growth and the
real interest rate. Although the separation
of product and financial markets creates a
sluggish response of the nominal price level
to a monetary shock, it is the dispersion of
markets rather than price stickiness per se
that creates the effect of money on real and
nominal interest rates in the model.
Limited-participation models suggesi
that econometricians can disregard aggregate
consumption data when examining thecon-
nection between consumption and interest
rates implied by the consumption-Euler
equation. The models instead impose a dif-
ferent necessary condition relating real inter-
est rates to different intertemporal marginal
rates of substitution. The Grossman and
Weiss model related it to the consumption
ofasubset of consumers, that is, those who
are “in financial markets.” The RHLP model
relates it instead to an intertemporal margin
faced by firms.
Several other researchers have extended
these kinds ofmodels to deal with other
asset-pricing issues. In a recent article, for
example, Lynch (1994) develops anon-mon-
etary model in whichaggregate consumption
data are not connected with asset prices in
the usual way because individual consump-
tion decisions are made at finite intervals
that are longer than the measurement inter-
val for assetprices (aggregate consumption
is related to asset prices indirectly and in a
different way however). (This is reminiscent
of the Grossman-Laroque model of purchases
ofdurable goods, whichare made infrequently
due to transactions costs). Lynch also assumes
individual heterogeneity in that decisions of
different individuals are staggered. This
assumption ensures that there is no decision
interval forwhich the model can be rewritten
in terms of arepresentative agent; hence,
aggregate consumption is not relevant for
asset prices. The staggering of decisions
makes the model similar to limited-participa-
tion models: With two groups of agents, say
Odds and Evens as in the earlier discussion,
Evens finance consumption in odd-number
periods out of previously held assets by selling
riskless, zero-transaction-cost assets. Finite
intervals for consumption decisions, with
staggered decision periods across households,
smooth the aggregate intertemporal marginal
rates ofsubstitution and reduce their correla-
tion with asset prices. Lynch studied the
implications of this model for the equity-
premium/riskless-rate puzzle (with mixed
success). (The infrequent decisionmaking
might be thought to be due to the costs of
making decisions; Lynch calculates that the
total utility loss relative to every-period dcci-
sionmaking isabout 1 percent of wealth.)
In Lynch’s model, consumption plans are
followed through with certainty between
decision intervals.
Though limited-participation models
of this sort appear to have metwith at least
some success in asset-pricing issues more
generally heterogeneous-agent limited-
participation models have not been applied
quantitatively to liquidity effects. Like the
representative-household litnited-participation
models, they break the simple link between
consutnption and interest rates implied by
the usual consumption-Euler equation. In
contrast to the RHLP model, they do not
replace that connection with a similar rela-
tion involving firms. Instead, they place
restrictions on movements in interest
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rates and consumption by asubset ofthe
population. This suggests those models
would be easier to test (using panel data)
than models in which money demand by
firms for purchases of inputs plays a major
role. It also suggests a possible common
model for explaining liquidity effectsand
resolving other asset-pricing puzzles. We
believe additional research along these
lines maybe useful.
CONCLUSb0 NS
Most economists believe that liquidity
effects appear in the data for the U.S. economy
though the size of the effects (if it even exists)
is asubject of controversy due largely to
identification problems in statistical work.
The theoretical explanation for nominal or
real liquichty effects also remains controversial.
While many economists interpret liquidity
effects as results ofsluggish noauinal price
adjustments, others interpret them as reflecting
costs ofcomplete and continuous participation
in markets that allow monetary changes to
cause redistributions or to channel spending
into certain areas (such as increased spending
by firms on factors of production). Others
suggest that liquidity effects reflect part. of
the economy’s coordination on a particular
equilibrium when multiple solutions arepos-
sible. Other alternative explanations may
appear in future research. Goodfriend (1995)
has recently suggested a anodel in which
imperfectly competitive firms face kinked
demand curves and price sluggishness emerges
endogenouslycreating real effects of monetary’
policy in which liquidity effects play a role.
More generally the problem ofexplaining
liquidity effects theoretically is part of the
broader problem of explaining the effects of
monetary policies on a wide range ofeco-
nomnic variables. Current explanations may
be suggestive, hut no definitive model has
yet emerged.
REFERENCES
Barro, Robert, and Herschel Grossman. “A General Disequilibrium
Model of Income and Employment,” The American Economic Review
(March 1971), pp. 82-93.
Beaudry, foul, and Michoel Devereut. ‘Monetary Policy and the Real
Exchange Rate in a Price-Selling Model of Monopolistic Competition,”
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series (forthcoming).
Blanchard, Olivier, and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki. ‘Monopolistic Competition
and the Effects of Aggregate Demand,” The American Economic
Review (September1987), pp. 647-66.
Carltan, Dennis. ‘The Theory ond the Facts of How Markets Clear: Is
Understanding Industrial Organization Valuable for Understanding
Macroeconomics?’ in R. Schmalensee and 1.0. Willig, eds., Handbook
of/ndustrial Organization. North’Holland, 1989, pp. 909-46.
Cho, Jong-Ok, and Thomas Cooley. ‘The Business Cycle with Nominal
Contracts,’ working paper (1990), University of Rochester.
Christiano, lawrence 1., and Martin Eichenbaum. “liquidity Effects and
the Monetary Transmission Mechanism,’ The American Economic
Review (May 1992a), pp. 346-53,
__________ and __________ . ‘liquidity Effects, Monetary Poliry, and
the Business Cycle,’ National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper No. 4129 (August 1 992b).
Cook, Timothy, and Thomas Hahn. ‘The Effect of Changes in the
federal Eunds Rote Target on Market Interest Rates in the l970s,’
Journal of Monetary Economics (November 1989), pp. 331-51.
Cooley, Thomas, and lee E. Ohonian. “Term Structure Inversion and
Real Activity,’ working paper (1990), University of Rochester.
Foma, Eugene F ‘Stock Returns, Real Activity, Inflation ond Money,’
The American Economic Review (September 1981), pp. 545-65.
Friedman, Milton, ‘Factors Affecting the level of Interest Rotes,~’
Savings and Residentin! Financing, 1968 Conference Proceedings,
U.S. Savings and loon league, 1968, p. 7.
Fuerst, Timothy. ‘liquidity, Loannble Funds, and Real Activity,” Journal
ofMonetary Economks ( February 1992), pp. 3-24.
Goodfriend, Marvin. ‘Moderately Inflatanary Monetary Paicy,’~working
paper (1995), Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
Grossman, Sanford, and laurence Weiss. ‘A Transactions-Based Model
of the Monetory Transmission Mechanism,’ The American Economic
Review (December 1983), pp. 871-80.
Hansen, Gory. ‘Indivisible labor and the Business Cycle,’ Journal of
Monetary Economics (Notember 1985), pp. 309-27,
lovanotic, loyan. ‘Inflation and Welfare in the Steady State,’ Journal
of Pout’cal Economy (February 1982), pp. 561-77.
King, Robert G. “Money and Business Cycles,’ warking paper (1991),
University of Rochester.
Kydlond, Finn, and Edward Prescott. ‘Business Cycles: Real Facts and a
Monetary Myth,’ Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly
Review (spring 1990), pp. 318.
Lucas, Jr., Robert F. ‘liquidity and Interest Rates,’ Journal of Economic
Theory (April 1990), pp. 237-64.
___________ ‘Interest Rates and Cunency Rates in a Iwo-Country Model,’
Journa/ of Monetary Economics (November 1982), pp. 335-59.
fEOERAL RRSRRVR BANK Of BY- LOUIS
24I1IE\’IF~
MAY/JUNI 7995
lynch, Anthony W. ‘Staggered DecisiorvMoking by Individuals: Pricing
Implications and Empirical Evidence,’ working paper (1994),
Univertity of Chicago.
Morcet, Albert ‘Solving Nonlinear Models by Parameterizing
Expectations,’ working paper (1990), Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis.
Ohanian, Lee E., and Alan C. Stockmon. ‘How Much Price Stickiness is
Necessary for Reasonable li~uidity Effects?’ working pr~er (1994).
Prescott, Edward. ‘Theory Ahead of lusiness Cycle Measurement,’
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy (spring 1986),
pp. 11-44.
Rotemberg, Julio. ‘A Monetary Equilibrium Model with Transactions
Costs,’ Journal of Politica/ Economy (February 1984), pp. 40-58.
Stockman, Alan C., and lee E. Ohanian. ‘The Short~RunIndependence
of Monetary Policy under Pegged Exchange Rutes,’ working paper
(1994), University of Rochester
ftDtnL flSEBVE BAHK Of 5Y LOUIS
25